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WORKIN’ 9:00–5:00 FOR NINE MONTHS:
ASSESSING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
LAWS IN GEORGIA
Kaitlyn Pettet*
INTRODUCTION
Kimberly Troupe worked at a Lord & Taylor department store as a
saleswoman where her work was deemed entirely satisfactory.1 She
became pregnant and started experiencing morning sickness, which
resulted in her tardiness to work.2 In a period of one month, she was
either late to work or left work early on nine out of twenty-one
working days.3 The next month she arrived late on three consecutive
days. 4 After receiving a warning from her supervisor, Troupe
continued to arrive late due to her pregnancy symptoms and was soon
after fired. 5 Troupe then filed a lawsuit claiming wrongful
termination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.6 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals sided with Lord & Taylor, however, and
upheld the termination.7
*

J.D. Candidate 2017, Georgia State University. First, thank you to Jenna Rubin for the constant support
and encouragement. Her mentorship made this Note possible. Thanks also to my Law Review editing
group for the hard work and laughs. Finally, thanks to Sheryl and the team for the outpouring of love,
patience, and support during law school.
1. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co. (Troupe II), 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co. (Troupe I), No. 92 C 2605, 1993 WL 191792, at *1 (N.D. Il.
June 4,1993). Because of her morning sickness, Troupe was placed on an afternoon schedule where she
would work from 12:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. Id. In a fifteen-day period, however, Troupe reported to work
late seven times ranging from ten minutes to one hour. Id. After a verbal warning from her supervisor,
Troupe reported to work fifteen minutes late to work and was given a written warning. Id. Her tardiness
improved after the written warning, but then over a three-day period she was again reporting late to
work. Id. She was then placed on a sixty-day probationary period and was told that any further tardiness
would result in her dismissal. Id. During the probationary period, Troupe was again late eleven times
and, as a result, was dismissed. Troupe, 1993 WL 191792, at *1.
3. Troupe II, 20 F.3d at 735.
4. Id. (Troupe received both verbal and written warnings from her supervisor).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 734. The court reflected that “[w]e do not know whether Lord & Taylor was less tolerant
of Troupe’s tardiness than it would have been had the cause not been a medical condition related to
pregnancy. There is no evidence on this question, vital as it is.” Id. at 736.
7. Id. at 738 (finding the plaintiff “ha[d] no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could infer
that she was a victim of pregnancy discrimination”). The District Court found in favor of May
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Debrah Rhett worked for a real estate company and received a
salary increase due to her satisfactory job performance. 8 Soon
thereafter, she informed her supervisors and coworkers that she was
pregnant and later left work on maternity leave.9 While on leave, the
company faced an economic downturn and was forced to eliminate
several positions, including Rhett’s.10 Rhett filed a lawsuit alleging
pregnancy discrimination.11 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the company’s actions did not violate the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.12
Suzanne Harvender became pregnant while working as a staff
laboratory technician. 13 She received a note from her physician
recommending that she should not be exposed to chemicals during
her pregnancy for fear of harmful effects on the fetus.14 The company
then placed Harvender on twelve weeks of Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA)15 leave and stipulated that if she were unable to return
Department Stores holding plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination and could not
prove satisfactory job performance. See Troupe I, 1993 WL 191792, at *3.
8. Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1997). Carnegie initially hired Rhett
as a temporary secretary, but, due to her work performance, granted her a full-time position and a salary
increase of $1,500. Id.
9. Id. Carnegie hired a temporary secretary to fill in while Rhett was gone on maternity leave. Id.
Carnegie also did not have a formal maternity leave policy but followed a practice of trying to hold
employee’s jobs open for them when their maternity leave was completed. Id. If the employee contacted
the company and something suitable was available at the time, the job would be opened to them. Id.
10. Rhett, 129 F.3d at 293. While Rhett was on maternity leave, the company experienced a
significant economy downturn. Id. at 293. The company decided to make a large number of cutbacks to
decrease costs, including the elimination of several positions. Id. Among the positions eliminated were
that of Rhett’s supervisor and Rhett herself. Id. In a letter to Rhett, the company informed her that it did
not consider her an employee at the time. Id. Rhett inquired about other positions with the company but
was informed that she was not qualified for the jobs and would not be considered for them. Id. at 293–
94.
11. Rhett, 129 F.3d at 295 (stating “it appears that Rhett was an employee of Carnegie on an unpaid
leave of absence who sought reinstatement. We need not, however, definitely so determine because even
assuming that Carnegie still employed Rhett when it abolished her position . . . she is not entitled to
relief”).
12. Id. at 297 (holding it is permissible for an employer to consider an employee’s absence on
maternity leave in making adverse decisions about her employment status).
13. Harvender v. Norton Co. No. 96-CV-653, 1997 WL 793085 *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
14. Id. Harvender requested assignment to the Research and Development Department for a light
duty assignment as she had done in an earlier pregnancy. Id. Norton responded that her request could
not be accommodated due to restructuring and downsizing. Id.
15. Id. The Family Medical Leave Act allows employees to take unpaid leave for specified medial
and family reasons such as the birth of a child. 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (2009). Employees have their jobs
protected while on leave and must be allowed to continue their group health insurance under the same
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to her job at the conclusion of the leave, the company would
terminate her employment.16 Harvender responded by filing a lawsuit
alleging pregnancy discrimination along with additional claims. 17
The district court held that the company had not engaged in
pregnancy discrimination.18
Cases such as Kimberly Troupe’s, Debrah Rhett’s, and Suzanne
Harvender’s demonstrate that there is still a considerable way to go
before women are no longer forced to choose between pregnancy and
keeping their career. Allegations of pregnancy discrimination in the
workplace are also on the rise. 19 In 1997, 4,000 plaintiffs filed
complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 20 By 2011, that number rose to 5,800. 21 The EEOC won
terms and conditions as if they had not taken leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.100. FMLA can apply to serious
health conditions that do not allow the employee to perform essential functions of their job. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.100; see also Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, (1993), https://www.dol.gov/
whd/fmla/.
16. Harvender, 1997 WL 793085 *1.
17. Id. Harvender also claimed knowing and intentional violation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act and that the company acted with the intention of causing her severe emotional distress. Id. The court
held that Harvender had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Norton’s behavior was extreme
and outrageous enough to overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. at *4. On the FMLA claim, the court ruled
that Harvender had failed to stipulate specific facts to create a genuine issue for trial. Id. at *8. Summary
judgment was entered for Norton. Id.
18. Harvender, 1997 WL 793085 *8 (holding that “while it may be true that Harvender wished to
continue working as a laboratory technician, the fact remains that she could not perform an essential
element of that job and therefore could not perform the job satisfactorily. In short, the plaintiff’s medical
condition prevented her from doing her job”).
19. Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35,
21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 68–69 (2013); see also D’Andra Millsap, Reasonable
Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1996); Daniela de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must
Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 275, 276 (2008); Eliza Simon, Parity by Comparison: The Case for Comparing Pregnant and
Disabled Workers, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 254, 260 (2015); Joan Williams & Elizabeth Westfall,
Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Careers” in the
Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 31, 31–32 (2006).
20. Claire Gordon, How Employers Get Away with Firing Pregnant Women – Legally, AOL,
http://jobs.aol.cocm;articles2012/04/05/epidemic-of-pregnant-women-getting-fired-legal-loopholes-tobla/20197174/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). The EEOC handles claims of employment discrimination on
basis of race, color, religion, sex—including pregnancy, national origin, age, disability, or genetic
information. Filing A Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2015). The EEOC is responsible for enforcement of the federal statutes related to
discrimination. Id. All the laws enforced by the EEOC require a filing of a Charge of Discrimination
before a person can file a job discrimination lawsuit against an employer. Id.
21. Gordon, supra note 20.
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significant damages in pregnancy discrimination cases,
demonstrating a greater tendency towards discrimination in the
workplace.22 Additionally, this rise in claims and awards caught the
attention of the nation’s media, placing new emphasis on the
treatment of pregnant women in the workplace.23
Against this backdrop of continued struggles by pregnant women
to have their rights fully acknowledged on the job, a number of states
responded by passing employment laws that require reasonable
accommodations for pregnant workers. 24 States such as Illinois,
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, and
Maryland shifted in the direction of recognizing reasonable
accommodations in the workplace similar to workers with disabilities
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 25 In fact, some
critics have gone so far as to argue that the ADA should be modified
to include pregnancy on its list of protected categories.26 Most other
states have thus far resisted this trend, however, and continue only to
provide protections that are contained in federal law.27
This note will examine the history of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) and some of the relevant case law that
informs its application, while arguing that the state of Georgia should
22. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 69. The EEOC has obtained monetary benefits in the
amounts of $30 million in 2007, $12.2 million in 2008, $16.8 million in 2009, $18 million in 2010, and
$17.2 million in 2011. Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
23. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 69.
24. See, e.g., HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (1990); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:341–342 (1997); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(I)–(J) (West 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.500(a) (2013); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 12945 (1)-(2) (West 2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.19 § 711 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 46a-60(a)(7)(B)–(G) (2011); MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 5-11B-2 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2015); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(s) (2014).
25. Tanya Marcum & Sandra Perry, It Doesn’t Work At Work: Pregnancy Discrimination in the
Workplace, 66 LAB. L.J. WL 3538782 (2015).
26. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 122–23; see also Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as ‘Disability’
and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 485–86 (2012); Simon, supra
note 19, at 272; Amanda Wachuta, The ADA Gets Even More Complicated: Analyzing Pregnancy with
Complications As A Disability, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 482 (2004); Joan Williams, Robin Devaux,
Danielle Fuschetti, & Carolyn Salmon, A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA
Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 111 (2013); see generally Deborah Calloway,
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995); Marjorie Jacobson,
Pregnancy and Employment: Three Approaches to Equal Opportunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1019 (1988).
27. See generally Marcum & Perry, supra note 25.
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adopt legislation that strengthens protections for pregnant women in
the workplace. 28 The note will then analyze the Supreme Court’s
recent ruling in Young v. United Parcel Service and discuss the
manner in which the decision will impact future jurisprudence
concerning the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.29 Finally, the note will
examine the state of pregnancy discrimination law in Georgia and
how Georgia has dealt with the question of pregnancy existing as a
disability requiring reasonable accommodations from employers.
Currently, Georgia does not provide additional protections
supplementing federal law against pregnancy discrimination and does
not require accommodations beyond what is required by federal
law. 30 Accordingly, the note will propose statutory changes that
Georgia should make to its existing employment laws to provide
greater protections for pregnant women and to join the growing
number of states requiring reasonable accommodations for pregnant
women.31
I. BACKGROUND
In the early twentieth century, paternalistic laws intended to
protect the health and safety of pregnant women were common.32 For
example, an Oregon law restricted the number of hours a woman
could work in laundries, and when challenged, the Supreme Court
upheld the law.33 In delivering its opinion, the Court reasoned: “That
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part III.
30. Employment Protections for Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/map/index.htm#Georgia (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 72.
[States] often relied on pregnancy-based classifications when regulating
employment generally or setting policies for public employees . . . . Such laws
ostensibly accommodated the domestic and reproductive obligations of women to
protect them from exploitation by employers . . . . But this “protection” was often
a pretext for preserving better jobs for men and did not affect all women equally.
Working-class women and women of color . . . suffered the most from the costs
of protection and there women received relatively few of the benefits.
Id.
33. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1908). Oregon law stipulated that no female employer
in any laundry facility in the state could work more than ten hours in any one day. Id. Violation of the
law was a misdemeanor subject to a fine. Id. The defendants in the case owned a laundry and were
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woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are
upon her.” 34 In the 1940s, a government agency—the Women’s
Bureau of the Department of Labor—recommended that pregnant
women not be permitted to work near the date of delivery or until at
least two months after birth.35 Several states adopted laws based on
this recommendation. 36 In the mid-twentieth century, a number of
states banned hiring women both before and after giving birth to their
babies to ensure that children were being properly provided for and
reared.37
Responding to pressure from advocates in the 1960s, the EEOC
issued guidelines38 in 1972 holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act extended to pregnancy discrimination.39 The law developed in a
mixed fashion, however, before the Supreme Court.40 On one hand,
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFluer, the Court heard a
charged with requiring a female employee to work more than ten hours in a day. Id. The defendants
were brought to trial and convicted of the offense. Id.
34. Id. at 421.
Even when they [women] are not [burdened by motherhood], by abundant
testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at
work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body,
and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
35. Women’s Bureau, Office of the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Bulletin No. 240, Maternity
Protection of Employed Women 7 (1952).
36. Marcum and Perry, supra note 25 at 12.
37. Deborah Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 982 (2013).
38. Milestones 1972, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1972.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015). The EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination to prohibit employers from
imposing mandatory leave of absences on pregnant women or firing women because they became
pregnant. Id. The EEOC also prohibited giving pregnant women less favorable health insurance or
disability benefits than provided to employees with other temporary medical conditions. Id.
39. Brake and Grossman, supra note 19, at 73.
40. Id.
As bad as these decisions were for pregnant working women, the Supreme
Court’s pregnancy jurisprudence did not foreclose all challenges to pregnancybased employment policies. The treatment of pregnant workers could still be
successfully challenged if it punished women for the status of being pregnant,
without regard to pregnancy’s actual effect on women as workers.
Id.
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challenge to school districts in Cleveland, Ohio requiring pregnant
teachers to stop teaching by their fourth or fifth month of
pregnancy. 41 The school prohibited the teacher from returning to
teach until the next regular school semester or until the child was at
least three months old. 42 To justify this policy, the school district
argued for the need for continuity of instruction,43 the health of the
teacher and the unborn child, 44 and the convenience of the
administration. 45 The Court held these practices violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 The Court reasoned
that the Due Process Clause protected fundamental liberties
pertaining to personal choices about child birth and the school district
could not “needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon this
vital area of a teacher’s constitutional liberty.”47
On the other hand, two cases before the Court demonstrated the
limits of the EEOC guidelines. 48 In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court
heard a challenge to a California disability insurance program that
excluded coverage for certain disabilities related to pregnancy. 49
Contributions from participating employees funded the program, but
not every disabling condition was covered. 50 A denial of benefits
resulted if a participating employee was committed as an alcoholic,
drug addict, sexual psychopath, or pregnant woman.51 In its ruling,
the Court rejected any notion that classifications based on pregnancy
41. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634 (1974).
42. Id. at 635. The school system also required that the teachers obtain a note from their doctor
certifying their physical fitness and their ability to resume their teaching responsibilities. Id.
43. Id. at 635, 6.
44. Id. at 641.
45. Id.
46. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 640 (stating “by acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for
deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on
the exercise of protected freedoms”); see also Newmon v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 374 F. Supp. 238, 247
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that a company policy that required ground employees to automatically take
maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy was unjustified).
47. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 640 (“While the regulations no doubt represent a good-faith
attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female
teacher for deciding to bear a child.”).
48. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
49. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486.
50. Id. at 487–88.
51. Id. at 488–89.
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should be subject to heightened scrutiny.52 Instead, the Court found,
“[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men
are not . . . . The program divides potential recipients into two
groups—pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.” 53 The Court
held there was simply no connection between the “excluded
disability and gender.”54
In a second case before the Court, a pregnancy discrimination
challenge under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in denial.55 In
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, General Electric provided an
employee benefit for non-occupational sickness to all employees but
specifically excluded any disabilities related to the pregnancy of its
employees.56 Several female employees whose benefit claims were
denied filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the plan violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.57 The district court reasoned that
pregnancy was neither a “disease” nor “accident,” rather it was a
disabling condition for a period of six to eight weeks.58 The court of
appeals affirmed the decision. 59 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed and held that General Electric’s benefits program was not a
form of pregnancy discrimination.60 The Court treated the exclusion
52. Id. at 496–97.
53. Id. at 496–97, n. 20.
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex of
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition.
Id.
54. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97, n. 20.
The appellee simply contends that, although she has received insurance protection
equivalent to that provided all other participating employees, she has suffered
discrimination because she encountered a risk that was outside the program’s
protection. For the reasons we have stated, we hold that this contention is not a
valid one under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 497.
55. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 125 (1976).
56. Id. at 127.
57. Id. at 128.
58. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 377 (E.D. Va. 1974).
59. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668 (4th Cir. 1975).
60. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 145–46.
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
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of pregnancy as a form of risk management in order to keep the
insurance plan available to all employees, and thus was “not
discrimination based on gender at all.”61 Despite the fact that only
women can become pregnant, the Court held that pregnancy was not
like other conditions that would typically constitute a disease or
disability.62
Popular reaction to the Court’s rulings in Geduldig and Gilbert
was largely negative, with one spokesperson for a leading women’s
rights organization denouncing the decision as a “slap in the face to
motherhood.” 63 Days after the Court handed down the decision, a
coalition of feminists and women’s groups created the Coalition to
End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers, vowing to “draft
legislation to combat the high court ruling.”64 Congress responded by
holding hearings and then beginning work on new legislation that
would countermand the Court’s ruling and provide new protections
for pregnant women in the workplace.65 The product of these efforts
would be the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.66
Enacted as an express repudiation of the Court’s decision in
Gilbert, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act passed by wide margins in
both houses of Congress.67 The text of the Act amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that discrimination based on

designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition.
Id. at 125.
61. Id. at 150. “Gender-based discrimination does not result simply because an employer’s disability
benefits plan is less than all inclusive. Petitioner’s plan is no more than an insurance package covering
some risks but excluding others and there has been no showing that the selection of included risks
creates a gender-based discrimination.” Id. at 126.
62. Id. at 136.
63. Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination By Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2009).
64. Id. Outraged women’s groups vowed to prepare “legislation to counteract the decision and
require that disability plans provide for the payment of wages to women out of work because of
pregnancy.” Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 75. The bill passed in the House 376-43 and passed in the
Senate 75-11. Id.
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sex included pregnancy discrimination.68 The text of the Act stated
“the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.”69 The Act went on to say that “women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.” 70 The Act thus categorizes pregnancy discrimination under
Title VII’s sex discrimination language. 71 In doing so, the PDA
renounces employment practices that force women “to choose
between their career and family obligations.” 72 The PDA also
embraces a basic principle that “women affected by pregnancy and
related conditions must be treated in the same manner as other
applicants and employees on the basis of the ability or inability to
work.” 73 This means that “an employer will not be liable for
dismissing a pregnant woman if she is unable to perform tasks
intrinsic to her employment, such as lifting heavy objects or working
overtime, unless she can show that the employer did not require the
same of other employees.”74
68. Pregnancy Discrimination Act Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2000)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Wendy Ray and Michelle Bell, Pregnancy Discrimination, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 617, 620
(2000).
Encompassing discrimination on the basis of ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions,’ the PDA proscribes, for any job-related purpose,
discriminatory treatment of a female applicant or employee on the basis that she
has been or is pregnant; has given birth or intends to give birth in the future; or
has obtained, is presently seeking, or contemplating an abortion. The PDA covers
not only female employees but also the spouses of male employees.
Id. at 621.
72. Id. at 621.
73. Id. at 622; see also Jessica Bergin, “Ability” Means Ability: An Ability-Centric Interpretation
that Reinvigorates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Protections for Pregnant Workers, 36 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 36, 36 (2014); Jeanette Blair, Pregnancy Discrimination, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 595, 598600 (2001); Brake & Grossman, supra note 19, at 76; Jamie Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy
Discrimination At Work: Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What It Says,” 86 . 703, 707 (2001); Joanna
Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41 (2009); Millsap, supra note 19, at 1425.
74. Ray & Bell, supra note 71, at 622 (“Courts have declined to characterize the PDA as a medical
leave act; thus, employers do not violate the PDA by discharging an employee for poor attendance in
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II. ANALYSIS: THE STATE OF STATES
Before assessing the manner in which Georgia might enact
pregnancy discrimination laws, it is important to analyze how other
states have approached creating such policies as a comparison. The
first states to expand their employment laws to grant additional
protections to pregnant employees included Hawaii and Louisiana.75
Hawaii requires employers to “make every reasonable
accommodation to the needs of the female affected by disability due
to and resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” 76 In Louisiana, employers must grant pregnant
employees the same benefits or privileges of employment that are
granted to temporarily disabled employees, including transfers to less
strenuous or hazardous positions.77 An employer must grant a request
for temporary job transfer so long as the request is one the employer
can reasonably accommodate. 78 A number of other states enacted
laws requiring that employers make reasonable accommodations for
pregnant employees, including Illinois, Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Texas.79 These states can loosely be classified into three categories.80
connection with a pregnancy, provided that the same poor attendance standards are applied to other
employees.”).
75. Marcum & Perry, supra note 25.
76. HAW. CODE R. § 12-46-107 (1990).
An employer shall not exclude from employment a pregnant female applicant
because of her pregnancy. It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to discharge a
female from employment or to penalize her in terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment because she requires time away from work for disability due to and
resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
Id.
77. LA. STAT. ANN. § 23: 342 (1997).
78. Id. It is an unlawful practice for employers:
[T]o refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to a less strenuous
or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she so requests, with
the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be reasonably
accommodated, provided, however, that no employers shall be required by this
Part to create additional employment which the employer would not otherwise
have created, nor shall such employer be required to discharge any employee,
transfer any employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is not
qualified to perform the job.
Id.; see also Gerald Huffman, The New Louisiana Employment Statutes: What Hath the Legislature
Wrought, 58 LA. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (1998).
79. Marcum & Perry, supra note 25.
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A. States That Require Accommodation Even Without A Doctor’s
Note
Illinois’s statute requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations for both full-time and part-time pregnant employees
during and immediately after their pregnancies.81 For the purposes of
the statute, reasonable accommodations include “frequent or longer
bathroom breaks, breaks for increased water intake, and breaks for
periodic rest, seating, assistance with manual labor, light duty,
temporary transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, the
provision of an accessible worksite; acquisition or modification of
equipment, job restructuring, and leave necessitated by pregnancy.”82
Employers are not mandated to undergo undue hardship in granting
such accommodations and are required to post notices of pregnant
employee rights in the workplace.83 Defenders of the law declared
that its provisions represented common sense legislation: “These are
80. Amanda Haverstick, Proliferating State & Local Pregnancy Accommodation Laws Make
Modifying ADA/FMLA Procedures A Must For Most Employers, FORBES (June 17, 2014, 2:15 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/06/17/proliferating-state-local-pregnancyaccommodation-laws-make-modifying-adafmla-procedures-a-must-for-most-employers/print/.
81. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(I)–(J) (West 2015).
If after a job applicant or employee, including a part-time, full-time, or
probationary employee, requests reasonable accommodation, for an employer to
not make reasonable accommodations for any medical or common condition of a
job applicant or employee related to pregnancy or childbirth, unless the employer
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
ordinary operation of the business of the employer.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
No employer is required by this subdivision to create additional employment that
the employer would not otherwise have created, unless the employer does so or
would do so for other classes of employees who need accommodation. The
employer is not required to discharge any employee, transfer any employee with
more seniority, or promote any employee who is not qualified to perform the job,
unless the employer does so or would do so to accommodate other classes of
employers who need it . . . . For an employer to fail to post or keep posted in a
conspicuous location on the premises of the employer where notices to employers
are customarily posted, or fail to include in any employee handbook information
concerning an employee’s rights under this Article, a notice, to be prepared or
approved by the Department, summarizing the requirements of this article and
information pertaining to the filing of a charge, including the right to be free from
unlawful discrimination and the right to certain reasonable accommodations.
Id.
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women who are healthy and want to continue working . . . .They’re
not looking to get out of work. What they want is a temporary
accommodation.” 84 The law passed the state legislature in a
unanimous vote.85 Critics of the law, however, complained that it was
not encompassing enough because it only applied to employers with
fifteen or more employees.86
Connecticut requires employers to make reasonable efforts to
temporarily transfer pregnant employees to a suitable position when a
woman informs the employer in writing of the need, and the
employee or employer reasonably believes that continued
employment in the previous position could cause injury to the woman
or her baby. 87 Connecticut law does not require written
documentation from a health care provider. 88 Critics of the
Connecticut law condemned the lack of health care provider
oversight and expressed worries that pregnant women would take
advantage of their pregnancies by asking for accommodations that
were not needed.89
B. States That Require Accommodation with Advice from A Physician
Another group of states require accommodations with the advice
of a physician. Alaska requires employers to give pregnant
84. Marsha Mercer, States Adding More Protections for Pregnant Workers, THE FLORIDA TIMESUNION (Jan. 9, 2015), http://jacksonville.com/breaking-news/2015-01-09/story/states-adding-moreprotections-pregnant-workers.
85. Brigid Schulte, States Move to Ensure Pregnant Workers Get Fair Chance to Stay on Job,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/09/08/
states-move-where-congress-wont-to-ensure-pregnant-workers-get-fair-shot-to-stay-on-job/.
86. Pregnancy Protections for Workers in States and Localities, A BETTER BALANCE (July 2016),
http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/images/stories/State_and_Local_PWFA_List.pdf.
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(A)–(G) (2011). It is unlawful for an employer:
[T]o terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy; to fail or refuse
to make a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable
temporary position which may be available in any case in which an employee
gives written notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer and the
employer or pregnant employee reasonably believes that continued employment
in the position held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee
or the fetus.
Id.
88. See id.
89. Mercer, supra note 84.
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employees whose health is affected by their pregnancy the same
employment benefits and any other privileges that are granted to
other employees who are similarly disabled. 90 This includes the
ability to take disability leave, sick leave, or other accrued leave that
the employer chooses to make available to other temporarily disabled
employees.91 Alaska also allows for the employee to request that her
employer transfer her to a suitable position. 92 In a similar vein,
California prohibits employers from refusing to provide reasonable
accommodations for pregnant employees, so long as the
accommodations are made with the advice of a health care
provider. 93 Employers must not refuse temporary transfer for
pregnant employees to less strenuous or hazardous positions for the
duration of pregnancy. 94 The California Chamber of Commerce
initially took issue with the law, arguing that the lack of definition for
reasonable accommodation would lead to an increase in litigation.95
90. ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.500(a) (2013).
91. Id.
92. Id.
A pregnant employee may request a transfer to a suitable position under this
section. An employer may not fill the position with a person other than the
requesting employee until the employer has offered the position to the employee
and the employee has refused the offer. A position is suitable if it is an existing
unfilled position in the same administrative division in which the employee is
currently employed and less strenuous or less hazardous than the employee’s
current position; transfer to the position is recommended by a licensed health care
provider; the employee is qualified and immediately able to perform the duties of
the position; and the transfer will not subject the employer to legal liability under
a collective bargaining contract or employment contract.
Id.
93. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (1)-(2) (West 2012) (It shall be unlawful “for an employer to refuse
to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for a condition related to pregnancy, childbirth,
or a related medical condition, if she so requests, with the advice of her health care provider”).
94. Id. It shall be unlawful:
[F]or any employer to refuse to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee
to a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she
so requests, with the advice of her physician, where that transfer can be
reasonably accommodated. However, no employer shall be required by this
section to create additional employment that the employer would not otherwise
have created, no shall the employer be required to discharge any employee,
transfer any employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is not
qualified to perform the job.
Id.
95. OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, BILL ANALYSIS A.B. 1670, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Ca.
1999).
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The Chamber also raised concerns about costs for small businesses
associated with required accommodations, and expressed
reservations that requiring accommodations would create hardships
for businesses. 96 Legislators, however, viewed existing law as
adequately defining reasonable accommodation, and the objection
was passed over.97
The state of New Jersey recognizes that “women are vulnerable to
discrimination in the workplace”98 such that the Legislature intends
to combat such discrimination by “requiring employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to pregnant women and those who suffer
medical conditions related to pregnancy and childbirth.”99 Examples
of reasonable accommodations include: “bathroom breaks, breaks for
increased water intake, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor,
job restructuring or modified work schedules, and temporary
transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work.” 100 New Jersey
exempts employers from needing to provide reasonable
accommodations if they can show that the accommodations will
cause undue hardship.101 The bill’s proponents emphasized that it did
not seek to treat women favorably, but equally under the law102, and a
sign of their success was that only a single member of the legislature
96. Id.
97. Id. California law stated that a reasonable accommodation was defined as “making existing
facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities, or job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices.” Id.
98. S.B. 2995, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J. 2013).
99. Id.; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(s) (2014).
100. Id.
101. Id. It is unlawful for:
[A]n employer to treat, for employment-related purposes, a woman employee that
the employer knows, or should know, is affected by pregnancy in a manner less
favorable than the treatment of other persons not affected by pregnancy but
similar in their ability or inability to work. In addition, an employer of an
employee who is a woman affected by pregnancy shall make available to the
employee reasonable accommodation . . . unless the employer can demonstrate
that providing the accommodation would be an undue hardship on the business
operations of the employer.
Id.
102. See Testimony on S.B. No. 2995 to the Senate Labor Committee, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J.
2013) (submitted by Ari Rosmarin, Public Policy Director, American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey) (Nov. 7, 2013).
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voted against the bill.103 Opponents of the legislation noted that it
would give pregnant women an unfair advantage in the workplace
and would shift work responsibilities and burdens unfairly to nonpregnant employees.104
West Virginia passed the Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act, which
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy that an employer would make for temporary disabilities
not related to pregnancy.105 Employees cannot be forced to accept an
accommodation that they do not want to accept, and an employee
cannot be forced into taking leave if an accommodation can be
made. 106 One critique of the bill may be that employers would be
subject to innumerable costs associated with being forced to provide
accommodations to pregnant women. At the same time, however, it
was unclear whether such costs would constitute an undue hardship,
although they pointed out that defining an undue hardship was
extremely difficult. Passage of the law provided evidence, in the
words of one supporter, “that this makes sense both as a matter of
policy and politics in a lot of different places.”107

103. Schulte, supra note 85.
104. Id.
105. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11B-2 (West 2014). It shall be unlawful for any employer:
[N]ot to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a job applicant or
employee, following delivery by the applicant or employee of written
documentation from the applicant’s or employee’s health care provider that
specifies the applicant’s or employee’s limitations and suggesting what
accommodations would address those limitations, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity; deny employment opportunities
to a job applicant or employee, if such denial is based on the refusal of the
covered entity to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations
related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of an employee
or applicant; require a job applicant or employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions to accept an accommodation that such
applicant or employee chooses not to accept.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Bryce Covert, West Virginia Considers Bold New Protections for Pregnant Workers,
THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 6, 2014), www.thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/06/3259061/west-virginiapregnant-workers/.
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C. States Requiring Accommodation if Pregnancy Causes Disability
A third group of states require accommodation if pregnancy causes
disability. Delaware requires that employers make reasonable
accommodations for employees who are limited on the basis of
pregnancy, unless those accommodations impose an undue hardship
on the employer. 108 Employers also may not deny employment
opportunities, require an employee to take leave, or take an adverse
action against the employee using a reasonable accommodation.109
The law passed the state legislature in a rare unanimous vote,
demonstrating broad support from civil rights groups to the business
community. 110 Minnesota requires reasonable accommodations for
pregnant women, on par with those required for non-pregnant
persons who are similar in their ability or inability to work.111 The
statute also requires transferring pregnant women to less strenuous or
hazardous jobs, if such a transfer can reasonably be
accommodated. 112 However, it only applied to businesses with
108. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.19 § 711 (West 2014).
109. Id. An employer may not:
[D]eny employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee, if such denial is
based on the need of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
known limitations related to the pregnancy of an employee or applicant for
employment; require an applicant for employment or employee affected by
pregnancy to accept an accommodation that such applicant or employee chooses
not to accept; require an employee to take leave under any leave law or policy of
the employer if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to the known
limitations related to the pregnancy of the employee; or take adverse action
against any employee in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment for
requesting or using a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations related
to the pregnancy of the employee.
Id.
110. Schulte, supra note 85.
111. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2015).
112. Id.
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer with a number of part-time or full-time
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current of preceding calendar year equal to or greater than 25 effective July 1,
1992, and equal to or greater than 15 effective July 1, 1994, an employment
agency, or a labor organization, not to make reasonable accommodation to the
known disability of a qualified disabled person or job applicant unless the
employer, agency, or organization can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the business, agency, or organization.
‘Reasonable accommodation’ means steps which must be taken to accommodate
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twenty-one or more employees, leaving a large number of small
businesses exempt from its requirements.113
In 2013, Maryland enacted the Reasonable Accommodations for
Pregnant Workers Act. 114 The Act requires employees to grant
reasonable accommodations to pregnant employees and dictates that
employers engage in every effort to find reasonable alternative means
of accommodation. 115 Reasonable accommodations under the law
include “(1) changing the employee’s job duties; (2) changing the
employee’s work hours; (3) relocating the employee’s work area; (4)
providing mechanical or electrical aids; (5) transferring the employee
to a less strenuous or less hazardous position; (6) or providing
leave.” 116 The debate over the Maryland bill also raised concerns
about costs associated with accommodations and the burden placed
on particularly small businesses. 117 Advocates countered that the
undue burden requirement would help ensure that any costs imposed
would be minimal.118
As this analysis of state pregnancy discrimination laws shows, a
discernable trend exists in state laws towards greater protections for
pregnant women in the workplace, in spite of objections focusing on
cost, fairness, and the breadth of the laws themselves. Despite this
trend, the state of Georgia provides no additional protections beyond
what federal law requires. 119 In particular, Georgia law fails to
provide specific prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination, with
the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified disabled person.
‘Reasonable accommodation’ may include but is not limited to, nor does it
necessarily require: (1) making facilities readily accessible to and usable by
disabled persons; and (2) job restructuring, modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, and the provision of aides on a temporary or periodic basis.
Id.
113. Pregnancy Protections, supra note 86.
114. MD. CODE. ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-609 (West 2013).
115. Id.
116. Id. (“If an employee requests a transfer to a less strenuous or less hazardous position as a
reasonable accommodation, the employer shall transfer the employee for a period of time up to the
duration of the employee’s pregnancy.”).
117. MARYLAND DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, H.B. 804, 2013 Sess.
118. Id.
119. Employment Protections for Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/map/index.htm#Georgia (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/5

18

Pettet: Workin’ 9:00–5:00 For Nine Months: Assessing Pregnancy Discrimination Laws in Georgia

2017]

9:00-5:00 FOR NINE MONTHS

789

the exception of state employees. 120 Georgia does not provide for
accommodations for pregnancy under its law.121 Finally, Georgia is
silent on pregnancy-related disability accommodation. 122 As the
state-level analysis clearly shows, Georgia is increasingly becoming
an outlier with regard to protecting against pregnancy discrimination
in the workplace.
III. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF YOUNG
United Parcel Service (UPS) hired Peggy Young as an early
morning “air driver” and she worked on a part-time basis in 2006 and
2007.123 As a condition of the job, UPS expected Young to be able to
“‘lift, lower, push, pull, leverage and manipulate’ items ‘weighing up
to [seventy] pounds[,]’” and to be able to “[a]ssist in moving
packages weighing up to 150 pounds.”124 In 2005, Young began in
vitro fertilization in an effort to get pregnant, and was ultimately
successful after three attempts.125 She then presented a note to her
supervisor from her doctor recommending that she not lift more than
twenty pounds while on the job. 126 Young’s supervisor concluded
that she could not perform the essential functions of her job any
longer and, per UPS policy, did not qualify for light duty or an
alternative work assignment because her restriction was not a
consequence of an on-the-job injury.127 Despite having exhausted her
medical leave, UPS granted Young an unpaid leave of absence, and
120. Id.;
Georgia—Laws
Relating
to
Pregnancy,
LEGAL
MOMENTUM,
https://www.legalmomentum.org/content/georgia-laws-relating-pregnancy (last visited Nov. 15, 2016);
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 478-1-.03 (2017).
121. Georgia—Laws Relating to Pregnancy, supra note 122.
122. Id.
123. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *1 (D. Md., Feb. 14,
2011).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *3–4. Young had repeatedly asked for and been granted leaves of absence during her
attempts at becoming pregnant. Id.
126. Id. at *4. Young’s doctor did not feel that a full restriction was warranted at that point in the
pregnancy and thus only made a recommendation that her lifting be kept to less than 20 pounds. Id.
127. Young, 2011 WL 665321, at *5. UPS argued that kinds of persons who were granted
accommodations were drivers disabled on the job, those who has lost their Department of
Transportation certificates or those who suffered a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Id. at *11.
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she lost her medical coverage at the end of 2006. 128 Shortly
thereafter, Young filed a charge with the EEOC alleging
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 129 “The District Court
granted summary judgment to UPS, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.” 130 The case was then appealed to the Supreme
Court.131
The Court in Young issued a number of important holdings in its
decision with significant implications for pregnancy discrimination.
First, the Court reviewed the text of the PDA and determined that its
language “requires courts to consider the extent to which an
employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats
non-pregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work.”132
The Court also reasoned that it must “consider any legitimate,
nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual justification for these differences in
treatment.”133 In sum, the Court was tasked with determining whether
a company’s policy burdened pregnant women and, if so, whether
this burden constituted intentional discrimination.134
Second, Young argued that if UPS accommodated any employees
with a lifting restriction, then it was obligated to accommodate
pregnant employees with a similar lifting restriction. 135 The Court
rejected this argument as unsound.136 This position, according to the
Court, would seem to say that the statute grants pregnant workers a
128. Id. at *6. Young gave birth to her child in 2007 and took a maternity leave to spend time with her
baby. She also did not feel physically or emotionally ready to return to work at that time. After
approximately two months, Young indicated she wished to return to work and she was allowed to do so,
resuming the same position she held before the pregnancy. Id.
129. Id. Young also claimed discrimination on the basis of race but voluntarily dismissed the racial
discrimination issue after discovery did not support such a claim in the case. Id. at *7.
130. Kay H. Hodge, Pregnancy Discrimination & Young v. UPS: Employers’ Duties, AM. L. INST.
(2015).
131. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
132. Id. at 1344; contra Pelkey v. Colo. Dep’t of Labor & Emp., No. 14-CV-02205-RBJ, 2015 WL
1740453, at *4 (D. Co. 2015) (holding that a plaintiff who alleges sex-based discrimination, but does not
show that her employer treated her disability differently from those similarly situated, cannot succeed on
her discrimination claim).
133. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1349. The Court reflected that the second clause of the PDA required employers to provide
the same accommodations to pregnant employees as they did to workplace disabilities that had other
cause but were similar in their effects. Id.
136. Id. at 1349.
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“most-favored-nation status,” and this could not have been Congress’
intent when passing the PDA.137 Young’s approach would have been
too broad in relieving a protesting worker of any burden to prove that
bias against her was intentional pregnancy discrimination. 138
Similarly, the Court also rejected UPS’s argument that the second
clause of the PDA does nothing more than “define sex discrimination
to include pregnancy discrimination.”139 Such a reading of the second
clause of the PDA, commentators pointed out, would render it
redundant and without purpose.140
Third, the Court held that a pregnant worker attempting to
establish disparate treatment could accomplish this through “indirect
evidence” by applying the McDonnell Douglas framework. That
framework requires that the plaintiff present a prima facie case by
demonstrating that she (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) sought
accommodation, (3) the employer did not grant that accommodation,
and (4) the employer accommodated others similar in their ability or
inability to work.141 The employer may then seek to offer a rationale
for its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff as long as the reason is
nondiscriminatory in nature.142 This “burden-shifting” analysis by the
137. Id. at 1349–50.
As long as an employer provides one or two workers with an accommodation—
say, those with particularly hazardous jobs, or those whose workplace presence is
particularly needed, or those who have worked at the company for many years, or
those who are over the age of 55—then it must provide similar accommodations
to all pregnant workers (with comparable physical limitations), irrespective of the
nature of their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or any
other criteria.
Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349–50.
138. Lyle Denniston, Fashioning a Remedy for Pregnancy Bias, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2015),
www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/opinion-analysis-fashioning-a-remedy-for-pregnancy-bias/.
139. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349; Denniston, supra note 140.
140. Denniston, supra note 140. The Court reasoned that statutes should be construed in such a way
that no clause should be taken as superfluous, void, or redundant. Id. The problem was that UPS’
reading of the PDA would create exactly that problem of the second clause. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–
53.
141. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
142. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. (“But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally
cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to
the category of those ‘similar in their ability or inability to work’ whom the employer accommodates.”);
see also Martin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 794, 819 (M.D. La. 2015) (holding that
an employer’s insistence that a pregnant woman take an unwanted leave of absence did not constitute a
reasonable accommodation as a matter of law).
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Court allows for the burden of proof in a pregnancy discrimination
case to be parsed between the plaintiff and the defendant depending
on the proof that can be offered.143
Finally, the Court reasoned that if the employer can show a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff may then attempt
to show that the offered reasons are in fact pretextual. 144 On this
basis, the Court concluded:
We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue
by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s
policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers,
and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory”
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but
rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.145
This being said, the Court was not clear on what a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” might be for an employer’s failure to offer
accommodations.146 This leaves unresolved the legitimate grounds on
which an employer can refuse accommodation to a pregnant
employee.147

143. Sam DiPrimio, Special Delivery: Young v. United Parcel Service Revives the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act While Denying Life to EEOC Guidance, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 408 (2015); see
generally Nicole Dunlap & Leanne Mehrman, Supreme Court “Delivers” New Life to Pregnancy
Discrimination Claims in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 89 FLA. B.J. 59 (2015); Kay Hodge,
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Summary, 22 ALI-CLE 17 (2015); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995 (2015); Ellen Taylor, Nathan Koskella, & Paul
Kang, Young. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 62 FED. LAW 72 (2015); Brinton Wilkins, Supreme Court
Weighs in on Disparate Treatment of Pregnant Employees, 20 UTAH EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2015).
144. Taylor et al., supra note 145. See also Grochowski v. Science Applications Intern, Corp., No.
ELH–13–3771, 2015 WL 5334051, at*14 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2015) (deciding that if a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, an employer may introduce legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions, to which the plaintiff may respond that such reasons were a pretext for
discrimination).
145. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
146. John DiMugno, Court Breathes New Life into the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 36 CAL. TORT
REP. NL 1 (2015). The Court stated that it is not enough that a policy be stated in pregnancy-neutral
terms and that a desire to avoid cost does not qualify either. Id.
147. Id.
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In the end, the Court concluded that Young could create an issue
of material fact of whether a significant burden exists by showing
that her employer accommodates a large number of non-pregnant
workers and refuses to accommodate a large number of pregnant
workers.148 In so deciding, however, the Court left unanswered how
many comparators are required to create an inference of
discrimination, especially when dealing with companies of far
smaller size than UPS.149 The Court also noted that Young could add
to her evidence the fact that UPS has multiple policies to
accommodate non-pregnant employees with lifting restrictions to
show that its reasons for excluding pregnant women are not
sufficiently strong and could give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination.150 This interpretation of the PDA is consistent with
Congress’ decision to supersede Gilbert’s finding that denying
coverage to pregnant women on a neutral basis was legal.151 As such,
it remained for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether Young’s
treatment compared to other non-pregnant employees was
pretextual.152
Young’s loss in the case would potentially enable employers to
reject even reasonable accommodations for pregnant women. 153 It
would also leave “pregnancy in a growing gap between the PDA and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, despite the compatible and
mutually reinforcing purposes of the two Acts.” 154 Moreover, as
148. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. The Court reasoned that if the facts are as Young claims them to be,
she could show that UPS accommodates most non-pregnant employees with lifting accommodations
while completely refusing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting accommodations. Id.
149. DiMugno, supra note 148.
The Court made its observation that the accommodation of “many” workers with
non-pregnancy-related limitations may establish an inference discriminatory
intent in the context of a dispute with a large, multi-national corporation with
thousands of employees. It is doubtful that the Court intended to limit the ability
of employees at smaller companies with far fewer employees to prove a
pregnancy discrimination claim.
Id.
150. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
151. Id. at 1355.
152. Id.
153. Brake &Grossman, supra note 19, at 72.
154. Id. at 72–73
Even though the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008
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previously stated, while many states worked in the past to increase
the protections for pregnant workers, no substitute exists for strong
federal-level protections for pregnant female workers.155
The Young case provides an easier route for plaintiffs to advance
pregnancy accommodation claims that had previously not survived
summary judgment. 156 It will also likely instigate more lawsuits
under the PDA and give rise to a broader range of claims by pregnant
women who believe they have been discriminated against in the
workplace.157 This will hopefully reverse the trend in states such as
Georgia with regard to pregnant plaintiffs establishing their
pregnancy discrimination claims.158 Finally, Young increases pressure
on states such as Georgia—states without any protections for
pregnant women beyond federal law—to implement legislation to
give guidance to employers on pregnancy discrimination laws and to
grant protections to pregnant women without the need to file
lawsuits.
IV. PROPOSAL: GEORGIA’S PATH TO ACCOMMODATION
Georgia’s decision not to implement any protections for working
pregnant women beyond what is required by federal law is clearly

broadened the universe of disabilities that require accommodations to include
temporary impairments and less severe impairments, normal pregnancy is still not
considered to be an impairment under the ADA. And yet, since many of the
temporary disabilities now protected under the ADAAA have similar workrelated effects as pregnancy, they should raise bar for accommodating pregnant
workers as well.
Id.
155. Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, Introduction to Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 66, 73 (2014).
156. Robert Meyer, Supreme Court Issues Decision Regarding Accommodation of Pregnant
Employees, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-courtissues-decision-regarding-accommodation-pregnant-employees.
157. Id.
158. See generally Hubbard v. Meritage Homes of Fla., Inc., 520 F. App’x 859 (11th Cir. 2013);
Grace v. Adtran, Inc., 470 F. App’x 812 (11th Cir. 2012); Slater v. ESG, Inc., 441 F. App’x 637 (11th
Cir. 2011); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. Dunbar
Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Welch v. Lincare, Inc., No. 7-09-CV-150 (HL),
2011 WL 1303319 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2011); Walden v. Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 1:06CV-2394-WSD-WEJ, 2008 WL 269619 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2008); Sermons v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga.,
227 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2002).
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out of step with what many other states are legislating.159 Pregnant
women in Georgia are placed at increased risk of workplace
discrimination, especially in terms of granting these women
reasonable accommodations for pregnancy-related symptoms.160 As
such, Georgia should enact a pregnancy discrimination law that
closes the federal gap and ensures that pregnant women are afforded
equal protection of the laws and their right to work.
A. Adhering to the PDA’s Four Criteria
The origin of the proposed Georgia law should consider careful
adherence to the PDA’s four criteria for determining a related
medical condition.161 First, the condition must be gender specific to
females, which addresses the very heart of the intention of the Act,
protecting women.162 Nothing in the history of the PDA indicates that
its intention is to protect men or that its purpose is something other
than protecting the rights of women.163 That being said, men are still
given protection under Title VII against sex discrimination. 164
Second, for a condition to constitute a related medical condition it
must be based upon the mother’s status as an employee. 165 In a
number of instances, claims have been made under the PDA that
appear consistent with the Act, yet courts have ruled that the
159. See Employment Protections, supra note 121. States that have enacted pregnancy discrimination
laws include Alaska, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Florida. Id. States that have enacted legislation protecting workplace lactation and breastfeeding include
Minnesota, Indiana and Tennessee. Id. States that have enacted both types of laws include California,
Oregon, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Illinois, Arkansas, Mississippi, Virginia, New York,
Vermont, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. Id. States not enacting either
type of law include (CHANGED from “are”) Idaho, Kansas, Alabama, North Carolina, and Georgia. Id.
160. See Molly Edwards, The Conceivable Future of Pregnancy Discrimination Claims: Pregnancy
Not Required, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 743, 751 (2010).
161. Id. at 750–51.
162. Id. at 750. In Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court held that the PDA was
enacted to “guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.” 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)
(emphasis added).
163. Edwards, supra note 162, at 751.
164. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
359, 376 (2009).
165. Edwards, supra note 162, at 753.
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activities were for the benefit of the child rather than the mother as an
employee.166 To prevent an unfair advantage for female employees
over males, the Act should only be applied to situations where the
condition is primarily affecting the employee.
Third, a “related medical condition” is one associated with
pregnancy.167 The fact that “the general term ‘other related medical
conditions’ follows the specific terms ‘pregnancy’ and ‘childbirth,’
[means] other related medical conditions must reference and
therefore create a causal link to pregnancy, childbirth, or both.”168
The Act narrowly focuses on pregnancy and pregnancy-related
claims and is not intended to apply to every condition affecting
women. 169 Finally, a related medical condition does not require
favorable treatment of women protected by the Act, but only
treatment equal to that given to employees with similar medical
conditions. 170 Thus, an employer who does not provide disability
benefits to employees is not compelled under the Act to provide such
benefits to pregnant women.171
While these criteria relate to the PDA, they can serve as a
guideline to Georgia in structuring a pregnancy discrimination law
that carries out the PDA’s intentions. This would also help Georgia
align itself with the Court’s decision in Young.172 The Court in Young
made it more difficult for employers to offer a defense to PDA claims
by allowing employees to prove discrimination through evidence that
the employer’s policies posed a significant burden on pregnant
workers.173 If the employer’s reasons for this discriminatory conduct
166. See Fleming v. Ayers & Ass’n, 948 F.2d 993, 996–97 (6th Cir. 1991); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures,
Inc. 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997); McNill v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. 950 F. Supp. 564, 569–70
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
167. Edwards, supra note 162, at 754.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 755 (“Without unequal treatment compared to a person ‘not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work,’ a protected woman would not have a claim under the PDA.”).
171. Id. It was not the intention of Congress that the Act create a system of preferential treatment for
women or a scheme in which women enjoyed some favored advantage under the law. Id. Women were
simply to be treated equally under the law and placed on par with all other employees. Edwards, supra
note 162, at 755.
172. Dunlap & Mehrman, supra note 145.
173. Id.
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are not sufficient to justify the burden, this insufficiency can create
something analogous to a disparate impact claim wherein the
employer is held responsible for conduct even in the absence of
intent to discriminate.174
Georgia, like all states, is interested in protecting employers as
well as pregnant women. Protecting pregnant workers is essential for
families in that it allows pregnant women to maintain their income.
Further, businesses benefit by keeping productive employees on the
job, and women can feel comfortable about the health of the unborn
when they do not feel compelled to perform work that their doctors
recommend they should avoid.175 The Court’s decision in Young also
places employers on more uncertain ground than in the past in
dealing with pregnancy discrimination claims.176 Georgia can help to
fill this void with clear legislation that articulates the duties and
responsibilities of employers when confronting pregnancy in the
workplace.
B. Right of Accommodation
To be truly effective, however, Georgia law should go beyond the
PDA and guarantee a right of accommodation for pregnant women in
the workplace. To accomplish this legislation, Georgia would do well
to model its legislation on the Americans with Disabilities Act. 177
The ADA was enacted in 1990 and amended in 2008 and exists to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.178 Additionally, the
ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees
with disabilities with the exception of when those accommodations
174. Id.
175. Allison Steinberg, Top 10 Reasons Why Protecting Pregnant Workers Is Good for Us All, ACLU
(Dec. 15, 2015), www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/top-10-reasons-why-protecting-pregnant-workersgood-us-all.
176. DiMugno, supra note 148.
177. Mikaela Shaw, The Resurgence of the Maternal Wall: Revisiting Accommodation Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 601 (2014); see also Joanna Grossman,
Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEORGETOWN L. J. 567, 625 (2010);
Maryn Oyoung, Until Men Bear Children, Women Must Not Bear the Costs of Reproductive Capacity:
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace to Achieve Equal Employment Opportunities, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 515, 529–36 (2013); Widiss, supra note 37, at 1035.
178. Simon, supra note 19, at 270.
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would cause an “undue hardship.”179 Initially after the passage of the
ADA, the Supreme Court construed the Act narrowly and required a
demanding standard for someone being able to qualify as disabled.180
Congress responded to this constricted interpretation by passing the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). 181 The ADAAA
expanded the ADA significantly, broadening the definition of
disability and making a point to extend protections to previously
excluded conditions. 182 The ADAAA expanded the definition of
disability to include: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) a record
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 183 Major life activities now include “performing
manual tasks” and “sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, and
bending.”184 Moreover, the statute makes clear that the condition is
not required to last longer than six months to qualify for ADA
coverage.185
Given that the ADAAA now covers temporary conditions, it seems
natural that the ADAAA would apply to pregnancy and that the
ADAAA’s accommodations requirements would be applicable to
pregnant workers. This has not, however, proven to be the case.
Some courts hold that pregnancy cannot be a disability because it
represents a natural life process. 186 Other courts focus on the
179. Id.
180. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002) (“We hold that to be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”); see also Stevens v.
Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
181. Simon, supra note 19, at 271.
182. Id. See also Amelia Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331,
360–61 (2010); Nicole Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014); Joan Williams et
al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 97, 99, 112 (2013); Michelle Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality
for Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 938 (2012); Carol Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad
Interpretation of ADAAA Disability Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limits” Mean?, 76
MO. L. REV. 43, 56 (2011); Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading Disability After the
ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1 (2013).
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012).
186. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996)
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voluntary nature of pregnancy as a reason to disqualify it from
disability coverage.187 Additionally, the EEOC provided guidance in
which it stated that “conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the
result of a physiological disorder are . . . not impairments” with
respect to the ADAAA. 188 At the same time, the EEOC has also
stated that, while pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA,
pregnancy-related impairments may be significant enough to be
covered under the ADAAA.189
C. Comparators
Despite the reluctance to bring pregnant women under the auspices
of the ADA at the federal level, the ADA accommodations model
should serve as a guide for Georgia in crafting legislation at the state
level. A number of states have already used the ADA’s language in
crafting their own pregnancy discrimination laws.190 There are also
compelling reasons why the ADA’s language and structure would be
a good model for Georgia. First, many women require
accommodations in the workplace to continue working during
pregnancy. In particular, women in physically demanding jobs are
most likely to lose their jobs after becoming pregnant. 191 Women
most likely to be affected by lack of accommodations on the job are
Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder. Being the natural
consequence of a properly functioning reproductive system, pregnancy cannot be
called an impairment. All of the physiological conditions and changes related to a
pregnancy are also not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or are
attributable to some disorder.
Id.
187. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976). See also Serednyj v. Beverly
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011).
188. Section 1630.2(h) Physical or Mental Impairment, Appendix to Part 1630—Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2011).
189. Simon, supra note 19, at 273. Courts have been split in recognizing the EEOC reasoning. In
Price v. UTI, Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital, and Alexander v. Trilogy Health Services, courts have found
in favor of pregnancy and disability discrimination claims and have validated the EEOC’s line of
thinking. In other instances, however, courts have refused to follow the EEOC’s lead. See Price v. UTI,
No. 4:11-CV-1428 CAS, 2013 WL 798014, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2013); Nayak v. St. Vincent
Hospital, No. 1:12-CV-0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 121838 at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013); Alexander v.
Trilogy, No. 1:11-CV-295, 2012 WL 5268701 at *11–12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012).
190. See supra Part III.
191. Cox, supra note 26, at 453.
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those who work in historically male professions and women in lowincome employment.192 In these occupations, women are often placed
in the unenviable position of choosing between their health and the
health of their unborn children or their careers. Accommodations for
such women during pregnancy are imperative.
Second, contrary to the fears of many feminists that characterizing
pregnancy as a disability would stigmatize pregnant women and
make them appear less capable of doing their jobs, the ADAAA’s
recent expansion would create just the opposite perception. If
Georgia embraces the ADA’s accommodations language for pregnant
women in the workplace, there is little fear that it would be
characterizing pregnant women as disabled and not capable of
performing their work.193 Rather than drawing renewed attention to
pregnancy’s physical limitations, the ADA’s accommodations
framework would simply place pregnancy on the same footing as
“diabetes, arthritis, asthma, and back problems that impose shortterm lifting restrictions.” 194 Pregnancy becomes just one more
physical condition that may necessitate accommodations for certain
types of jobs. It imposes no more of a stigma than other conditions
creating a short-term disability in need of accommodation.
Third, Georgia’s use of the ADA accommodations model for its
legislation provides a useful comparator for litigation that requires
192. Id.
Rigid work rules restrict workers’ ability to consume water, vary their working
positions, and curtail repetitive, physically demanding activities. In these
industries, women able to fully conform to employer expectations oriented around
male norms during the rest of their work lives predictably lose their jobs when
they become pregnant. This job loss not only directly reduces the number of
women in predominately male occupations but also indirectly contributes to
occupational sex segregation by discouraging other women from pursuing jobs
they risk losing when they become pregnant.
Id.
193. Id. at 468–69.
194. Id. at 472
[By way] of comparison, whereas over 40 percent of the population will become
pregnant at some point in their lives, less than 2 percent of the population is
pregnant each year. Accordingly, in any given year, the number of persons with
diabetes and hypertension (as well as the probably larger number of persons with
back problems) eligible for ADA accommodations will likely eclipse the number
of eligible pregnant workers.
Id.
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assessment of accommodations needs for pregnant women. For
example, “many pregnant workers who are denied accommodations”
would be able to “point to similarly impaired employees with ADA
accommodations as comparators who were treated better.” 195
Moreover, the expansion of pregnancy as a comparator to ADAcovered employees is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the PDA
itself. 196 Without including pregnancy as a disability, the group of
comparators for PDA plaintiffs would shrink to an inconsequential
amount. Plaintiffs would then find it virtually impossible “to identify
a ‘large percentage’ of non-pregnant, impaired workers who were
treated better because those workers would be covered by the ADA,
and therefore unavailable.” 197 Pregnant workers would effectively
become the only temporarily impaired employees not subject to
accommodations in the workplace. This result falls far short of the
demand of courts that pregnant employees be treated equally to other
workers and undermines the purpose of the PDA. This result cannot
be what Georgia intends and, therefore, necessitates the
implementation of the ADA accommodations model into pregnancy
discrimination legislation.
On the other hand, Georgia is a right-to-work state and is known
for having a business friendly environment.198 Legislation following
the ADAAA accommodations model has been proposed in Georgia
but has not been passed.199 Part of the reason for the lack of passage
is continued concerns on the part of businesses about the costs of
195. Simon, supra note 19, at 276. (“Given courts’ traditional reluctance to view pregnancy-related
impairments as disabilities, as well as the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Young on the centrality of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to proving pregnancy discrimination claims, this expansion of the pool
of comparators available to PDA claimants may prove to be critical.”).
196. Widiss, supra note 37, at 1024–25.
197. Simon, supra note 19, at 276. Since the ADAAA was enacted, no court has explicitly addressed
whether PDA plaintiffs may use ADA-covered workers as comparators. Id. Some early cases suggest
that the comparison is inappropriate and some scholars have agreed with this assessment. Id. But most
of these judgments were taken pre-Young and have not been update given the Court’s ruling in that case.
Id. To date, no case has explicitly stated that ADA comparators were never available to PDA plaintiffs
and other cases suggest the comparisons are completely appropriate. Id.
198. See Georgia Right to Work Laws, FINDLAW.COM, statelaws.findlaw.com/georgia-law/georgiaright-to-work-laws.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); America’s Top States for Business 2014, CNBC,
www.cnbc.com/2014/06/24/americas-top-states-for-business.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
199. S.B. 417, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).
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requiring accommodations for pregnant women and the desire for
independence and autonomy in structuring business operations and
handling personnel issues. 200 Put simply, businesses tend to resist
further regulations on their practices rather than to embrace them.
Moreover, many businesses still balk at the idea of making
accommodations for a condition that is largely a product of personal
choice, and see such accommodations as being unfair to other nonpregnant workers. 201 Therefore, the path to accommodations for
pregnant women in Georgia will likely remain an uphill struggle.
CONCLUSION
The PDA intended to provide broad protections for pregnant
women in the workplace by ending pregnancy discrimination and
providing women with legal avenues to pursue claims for alleged
discriminatory activity by employers. While the PDA advanced the
cause of equality in the workplace to a large extent, many states have
gone beyond the PDA to incorporate accommodations legislation that
mandates employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
pregnant employees. Georgia, thus far, has been reluctant to join this
growing list and has left pregnant employees without the benefit of
the full protection of the law. As such, Georgia should pass
accommodation legislation to ensure the equal treatment of pregnant
women in the workplace.
Georgia has a vested interest in protecting the health and wellbeing
of working mothers, while recognizing the financial obligations
many women have requiring them to continue working throughout
their pregnancies. In an ideal situation, women would have the
financial resources to choose whether they remain employed during
pregnancy. The time has come for Georgia to recognize that pregnant
workers often cannot afford to be out of work and most certainly
cannot risk losing their jobs. Women simply should not be forced to
choose between being pregnant and being employed. Reasonable
200. Cox, supra note 26, at 477.
201. Id. at 481.
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accommodations legislation ensures that women are not placed in
this position. Further, pregnant employees would be guaranteed
treatment equal to other temporarily disabled employees. Such
accommodations are currently not guaranteed to pregnant women in
Georgia and Georgia women demand and deserve equal employment
options under the law.
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